

## SUMMARY

### BOGUSHIA

This is the story of the childhood of a Jewish baby who was abandoned on a street in Poland during the days of the Holocaust. A Polish woman, who accidentally came upon the "crying bundle" next to a fence on a cold October morning in 1942, brought her home, adopted her as a daughter, and raised her despite all of the risks throughout the days of the war.

The story of this girl — Shifra Kotzer, a member of Kibbutz Sha'ar Hagolan, and a mother of three children — was told in a series of letters by the rescuing "mother", Leokadia Yeromirska, at the request of Shifra's husband, Yoram Kotzer, a kibbutz son.

These letters, which were sent from Vrotzlav (Poland) 20 years after the events, are a great and moving human document, filled with love and unlimited self-sacrifice. This is also and very honest and convincing testimony from a lonely woman, whose husband was arrested and sent to Aushwitz, who was criticized by her family, who had to battle for her daily wages and her daily bread, who took a courageous stand against a hostile environment, in order to defend that which was most dear to her — her little Jewish daughter.

### FROM THE MEMOIRS OF A PARTIZAN — YA'ACOV SEGALCHIK

This witness wrote in this broad ranging testimony a record of the period from the outbreak of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, up until the liberation.

It includes a description of the life and annihilation of the community Dolhinov (his birthplace) in White Russia, as well as the fate of the other Jewish towns in the area (Miadziol, Globok, Postav and others). The author, after a number of attempts and failures, succeeds in organizing a group of youth and takes them out of the Ghetto (right in the middle of one of the Nazi's deportations actions) in April 1942, and they are accepted in a partizan unit in the forests of Byelorussia. Eventually, after the Jews have proven themselves to be courageous fighters, the command establishes a special Jewish unit inside of the division, and Segalchik is appointed its commander. This unit is credited with having carried out many daring acts of sabotage, fighting, and acts of revenge against murderers of Jews in the area, etc.

However, a unique chapter, which is worthy of special mention, is the testimony of the organized rescue activities which were carried out in order to save the remaining Jews in the Ghettoes, in order to bring them out to the forests. The witness relates that many of these Jews (and this includes women and children) were carried past the frontlines into the Soviet Union — a distance of 500 kilometers.

Ya'acov Segalchik, together with his wife (who was a member of one of those groups) immigrated to Israel in 1958 after going through many hardships after the liberation.

### THE MONEY FORGERS IN ZAKSENHAUSEN — M. BURGER

M. Burger was born in Slovakia in 1917, his profession — printer. He was arrested by the Gestapo in Bratislava and brought to Auschwitz. In 1944, he was transferred along with 10 other prisoners who were also printers to the Zaksenhausen

camp — where the Nazis founded a large printing house for forgeries. The witness describes in his recorded testimony two blocks (17 and 18) which were hermetically sealed, and which even the camp commander wasn't allowed to enter, in which the Germans concentrated 140 professionals (printers, artists, bank workers etc.) from all of the occupied territories.

In this "Factory for Forgery" which was under the direction of Kaltenbrunner himself, every form of document in the world was forged: Permits from the N.K.V.D., travel orders from the American Navy, British passports, stationary paper from the Jewish Agency, and stamps. But the major "product" was forged British pounds and dollars, which were used to pay Gestapo agents, and which were distributed throughout the Allied countries. The witness describes acts of sabotage against "production" and the constant danger that confronted them. Beginning in January 1945 — the Germans began to move the factory from place to place — (Radeltchik, Mauthausen, Shevil) with the intention to renew the production of forgery... Eventually, all of the prisoners were rescued.

#### THE HOLOCAUST AND THE REVOLT IN PINSK — NACHUM BONE

This is a part of a detailed monograph on the end of the community of Pinsk, a major Jewish community in the border area of Polesia in Poland, (today the Soviet Union).

The author writes in his introduction: "The fate of the Jews of Pinsk, like the fate of the majority of the European Jews, was almost total annihilation. Along with the destruction of the lives and property, all of the documents which could have aided us in compiling a record of the final chapter of the life of the Jews of Pinsk were lost. No trace was left of the Judenratt Archives, and not a single testimony or diary has been found that was written during the days of the Nazi occupation in the city".

Nachum Bone has based his work on the testimony of survivors, written memories, and material which was taken from the testimonies which were given to the national offices of the Israeli police, and to court houses in Tel-Aviv and Haifa, to be used against Nazi war criminals, who were involved in the murder of the Jews of Pinsk. On the basis of the aforementioned material, the author has succeeded in creating an accurate portrayal of the life, the struggle and the pattern of destruction of the Jews of Pinsk — his hometown. (The monograph appears in its entirety in the Book of Pinsk).

#### THE MOTIVES FOR HITLER'S INVASION OF RUSSIA — DR. J. L. WALLACH

By invading the Soviet Union on the 22 June, 1941, Hitler had deviated from the view handed down to him by generations of German military thinkers and experts. For generations Clausewitz' opinion about the Russian space, and about war in Russia, against the background of Napoleon's debacle in 1812, set the fashion for the attitude of the German military toward Russia. He considered his conclusions, laid down in his study of the Russian campaign of 1812, as being of such importance that he included them in his theoretical work "On War". He stated that "...Russia, by the campaign of 1812, has taught us that an empire of great dimensions cannot be conquered (which might have been easily known before)..."

Field Marshal Moltke was completely daunted by the difficulties presented by the Russian space.

Count von Schlieffen rejected the "Great Eastern Deployment Plan".

Other German military theoreticians, E. G. Colmar von der Goltz, von Freytag-Loringhoven, Friedrich von Bernhardi a. o., followed suit.

When General von Falkenhayn was appointed to the post of Chief of the German General Staff in 1914, he too, shrank at the prospect of becoming involved in the vast Russian territory.

However, after the First World War, two different opinions emerged: of General Hoffmann, and General W. Reinhardt.

Anyhow, General von Seeckt, the Chief of the "Reichswehr", was appalled by the Russian space, which he knew too well from his own experience. He was in favour of close co-operation with Russia and the Red Army. He was convinced that, by pursuing a pro-Russian policy, he had solved the ancient problem of war on two fronts.

It has been said that General Keitel had prepared a memorandum in 1940, warning against a campaign in Russia, mainly for historic reasons. Jodl, Hitler's principal military adviser, in a lecture delivered to the Gauleiters of the National Socialist Party on 7 November, 1943, pointed to the dangers which accompanied the penetration into the huge Russian space. Other German Generals were opposed to the campaign from the beginning. From the First World War they had obtained considerable knowledge of the east, whereas Hitler had never been in the east in WW I.

It has already been mentioned that, after the First World War, some different ideas about the Russian space had been aired by General Hoffmann and Reinhardt. However, it is quite obvious that these were sporadic and individual opinions only. They did not present a basic change in the traditional attitude of German soldiers, from Clausewitz to the Second World War. We do not know whether Hitler had read Hoffmann's and Reinhardt's books, or was in any way influenced by their ideas. It is important to try to understand why Hitler had not only deviated from German military tradition, but had violated his own principle of avoiding a war on two fronts at any price.

For purely methodical reasons Hitler's reasons may be classified under four main topics, though in fact they were all closely interwoven. These four topics are:

1. Ideological reasons; 2. Psychological reasons; 3. Economic reasons; 4. Purely military reasons.

Of late, there is a trend to minimize the importance of the ideological impetus for Hitler's decision. However, Hitler's basic aims had always been expansion in the East, the famous slogan of "Drang nach Osten" as formulated in "Mein Kampf". The assumption that a conflict with Bolshevism was inevitable added further urgency.

There were at least four main psychological reasons: First, Hitler doubted whether Germany might be prepared to launch an additional war after the defeat of England and therefore decided to start the war against Russia before embarking on a war against England. Secondly, Hitler's continental outlook made him fear British sea-power. Thirdly Hitler, the foot-soldier of WW I shrank at the idea to sacrifice his troops on the seas and let them be drowned helplessly and without fighting, as might be the case in a war against England. No such danger was imminent in a war in the East. And last but not least, he underrated the British national character, and did not believe that England would carry on fighting after the British eviction from the Continent.

Hitler was afraid the USSR might take control of the Rumanian oil fields, a step which could stangle Germany's war effort. Moreover, he longed for Russia's natural resources as a counterpoise against the British naval blockade. One may argue that the economic agreement with the Soviet Union provided Germany with the same advantages without resorting to war. However, one has to keep in mind that Hitler's character would not tolerate the thought of being dependent on someone else.

From a military point of view, he considered England to be defeated. Accustomed to Blitzkrieg-campaigns he firmly believed that the same process could be repeated in Russia. A quick defeat of the Soviet Union would free Germany's rear from any menace, if Great Britain should renew the war in the West. Moreover, Hitler meditated upon the reasons why Great Britain, in spite of her desperate situation, would not come to terms. He deduced that England was still expecting increasing support from the USA, and hoped that Russo-German relations would deteriorate. He therefore resorted to Schlieffen's old solution: depriving England of her "continental sword". This meant smashing the Soviet Union. That having been achieved, England would beg for peace and a naval action would become unnecessary. It is obvious that Hitler did not think that he might become involved in a prolonged war in Russia. He reckoned with a Blitz-campaign of three to four months. He considered the German Armed Forces as superior the Red Army in organisation, equipment, and leadership. The Red Army was regarded as possessing a very low capability for battle. The campaign would terminate in the line Archangel-Astrakhan. Germany would hold the conquered territory with up to sixty divisions.

#### EDUCATION TOWARDS RACIAL VIOLENCE — YOSEF LEVINGER

The author, a teacher and an educator, surveys the Nazi educational methods, their goals and their means of realization. He relies on the vast literature that was written by the holders and the formulators of these racist educational theories. After the author cites a number of outstanding examples of education towards racial violence, he comes to the following conclusion: "It's true that we can't attempt to understand the process of the capturing and reinforcing of governmental power, if we divorce it from the German and international conditions that existed at the time. but if we want to understand the factors which led to the relative stability of the regime, and the source of its continued existence and strength even after outstanding defeats in the war (after El-Allamein and Stalingrad) it is very likely that the success of the inculcation of Nazi education in the masses, and particularly among the youth — will be shown to have played an important role, and perhaps even a decisive one".

TZVI EREZ — surveys Dr. Levia Rotkirchen's work "The Development of Anti-Semitism and the Persecution of the Jews in Hungary during the years 1920—1945" which appeared in the form of an introduction to Moshe Zandberg's book "The Endlessyear" (Yad Vashem — 1966), and makes a number of comments and criticisms.

# YALKUT MORESHET

PERIODICAL

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